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I. Introduction
A large proportion of corporations in many countries have been traditionally borrowing in a foreign currency.
1 More recently and prior to the financial crisis also many retail clients, i.e., households and small firms, have taken out foreign currency loans. In countries such as Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, and Bulgaria, for example, retail clients still hold a similar or larger share of their loans in foreign currency than corporations (European Central Bank (2010) ).
These retail loans in foreign currency are popularly believed to be "small men's carry trades", 2 i.e., loans in which households and entrepreneurs seek lower interest rates and take unhedged exchange rate risk upon themselves (Sorsa, Bakker, Duenwald, Maechler and Tiffin (2007) ). Yet in an empirical study document that foreign currency borrowing by small firms in transition countries is much stronger related to (firm-level) foreign currency revenues than it is to (country-level) interest rate differentials.
3 Thus -carry-trade behavior‖ may in fact not be the key driver of foreign currency borrowing (see also Brown and De Haas (2012) ).
1 In East Asia, corporate debt is split about equally between foreign and domestic currencies (Allayannis, Brown and Klapper (2003) ) while in several Latin American countries the share of foreign currency debt exceeds 20 percent (Galindo, Panizza and Schiantarelli (2003) ). Between 20 and 75 percent of all corporate loans in Eastern European countries are denominated in a foreign currency (European Central Bank (2006) , p. 39).
2 Wall Street Journal, May 29 th , 2007. Carry trades, in which investors borrow in a low-yielding currency and invest in a high-yielding one, are a widespread phenomenon. At the beginning of 2007 it was estimated that that as much as US$1 trillion was involved in the yen carry trade for example (The Economist, February 1 st , 2007) . Traditionally, carry trades have been made by large financial institutions and leveraged institutions, such as hedge funds. Low exchange rate volatility and persistent interest rate differentials have fueled the growth in cross-currency positions in recent years (Galati, Heath and McGuire (2007) ). 3 They investigate the currency denomination of individual bank loans granted to 3,101 small firms in 25 transition countries between 2002 . Brown, Kirschenmann and Ongena (2010 examine the requested and granted loan currency of small business loans granted by one retail bank in Bulgaria. Other studies have examined foreign currency borrowing by analyzing aggregate cross-country data (e.g., Basso, CalvoGonzalez and Jurgilas (2011) , Rosenberg and Tirpák (2008) , Luca and Petrova (2008) ) or the currency denomination of debt of large firms within a single country (Kedia and Mozumdar (2003) , Keloharju and Though a number of recent theoretical papers have started to model the choice of loan currency in a way that may also be relevant for small firms (Allayannis, Brown and Klapper (2003) ), a theoretical framework to understand foreign currency borrowing in retail credit markets where informational asymmetries are acute is still lacking (see also the review in Nagy, Jeffrey and Zettelmeyer (2011) ).
In this paper we aim to fill this gap in the literature by introducing an information asymmetry between banks and firms in a framework that also features a trade-off between the cost and risk of debt. We conjecture that banks do not necessarily know the currency in which (small) firms have contracted their sales, and/or the firms' actual revenue levels, an issue that may be particularly relevant in transition and developing countries.
Information asymmetries between banks and firms underpin our modern understanding of financial intermediation (Freixas and Rochet (2008) ) and the asymmetries may be aggravated in transition and developing countries. The currency denomination of a firm's current and future sales contracts is often negotiated (and a closely guarded secret).
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Depending on bank type, size or ownership and the degree of competition in the banking sector, banks may have difficulties or lack incentives to collect detailed information about firm revenues.
The costs of information acquisition are particularly high when dealing with small firms, which are less likely to have audited financial accounts, 5 and when dealing with Niskanen (2001) , Benavente, Johnson and Morande (2003) , Cowan, Hansen and Herrera (2005), Gelos (2003) ) or across countries (Rajan and Zingales (1995) , Booth, Aivazian, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001) , Allayannis, Brown and Klapper (2003) , Cowan (2006) , Esho, Sharpe and Webster (2007) , Kamil (2009), and Kamil and Sutton (2008) ). Clark and Judge (2008) provides a review of the relevant empirical literature.
firms that are located in transition and developing countries, where due to the weak corporate legal system it is hard for banks to assess the credibility of available firm-level financial information (Pistor, Raiser and Gelfer (2000) , Brown, Jappelli and Pagano (2009) ). Firms therefore often borrow without having audited statements. Banks also can not verify firm sales information through advanced cash management services, which are yet to be introduced in many firms. Consequently, -soft‖ information may be the only type of information that is available, but foreign banks  which are widely present in transition and developing countries  may struggle to collect and use it (Stein (2002) , Detragiache, Tressel and Gupta (2008) ).
Our model clarifies how the choice of loan currency is affected by the bank's lack of information about the currency denomination and level of the firm's revenues, an acute issue for many banks when dealing with small firms in transition and developing countries. Existing models demonstrate that firms' choice of loan denomination is affected by the structure of firm revenues, 7 interest rate differentials between local and foreign currency these services (e.g., Tsamenyi and Skliarova (2005) ) or firms do not demand them (for example, in the survey analyzed in , one third of the firms report receiving less than one third of their income through their banks). Banks may also lack information on firm quality, project choice, or managerial effort, for example, incurring monitoring costs (Diamond (1984) , Diamond (1991) ) or forming relationships with the firms (Sharpe (1990) , Rajan (1992) Consequently, our model identifies the information asymmetry between lending banks and borrowing firms as a so far overlooked potential driver of -dollarization‖ in the credit markets. We also find the conditions under which all firms will be borrowing in foreign currency (full pooling equilibria), as well as no foreign currency loans will be 9 In Jeanne (2000) financiers face an information asymmetry concerning the effort level of the exporting entrepreneurs. Exporters borrow locally in domestic or foreign currency. But borrowing in a foreign currency serves as a commitment device: The entrepreneurs have a stronger incentive for effort if they have foreign currency debt, because failure to achieve high returns is automatically sanctioned by termination. In Cowan (2006) firms with more foreign income and firms in countries with a higher interest differential (where foreign currency funds are cheaper) will have more foreign debt. Firms that are more financially constrained, i.e., firms that experience a higher risk premium when borrowing from a bank, are more likely to match the denomination of debt to their income streams. These firms would have to borrow at higher costs if they become financially distressed due to the accumulated currency mismatches. If a bank knows a firm is mismatched, it may pass on the corresponding expected default costs. In contrast to Jeanne (2000) , in which firms only have foreign revenues, firms in our model have domestic or foreign currency earnings. In Jeanne (2000) entrepreneurial effort is unobservable to the financiers; in our model, the currency in which sales are contracted and sales revenues are collected cannot be observed by the bank.
offered by banks to firms who cannot prove they have either high or foreign currency income (market failure). The key predictions of our model are consistent with for example recent evidence by Degryse, Havrylchyk, Jurzyk and Kozak (2012) who find that foreign banks that enter via greenfield investment, and that may face more information asymmetry than those foreign banks that enter via domestic take-overs, lend more in foreign currency.
We leave the more comprehensive testing of our model hypotheses to future empirical research.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Our model assumptions are introduced in Section II, followed in Section III by the analysis of the model with perfect information.
In Section IV imperfect information is introduced. Section V concludes and summarizes all key firm-and country-level empirical predictions.
II. Model Assumptions
Define t e , the exchange rate at time t , to equal the amount of local currency per unit of foreign currency, normalized at There is a continuum of firms and each firm needs to invest
in local currency at 0  t to receive any revenues at 1  t . Firms differ in their revenue structure. There are three types of firms, foreign ( F ), good local ( LG ) and bad local ( LB ) currency earners.
10 As we assume that the level of firm revenues does not change with the exchange rate, the changes in the exchange rate in our model are assumed to be real. and set the unit cost of local currency funds to l i . We assume that the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) is not fulfilled, and that there is an interest rate advantage to foreign 11 Under perfect information, all foreign currency earners would take foreign currency loans at the same interest rate independent of their revenue level. With asymmetric information about firm revenues this result also holds for reasonable assumptions on firm-level distress costs, as we show in an earlier version of our model (Brown, Ongena, Popov and Yeşin (2011) ). See Goldberg and Knetter (1997) , for example, on exchange rate pass-through. 12 While we assume that firms maximize expected income, their payoff is not linear in expected income when we assume distress costs. The assumption of distress costs implies that firms care about income variance, as would be the case if we assumed firms were risk-averse.
13 Firms in our model receive both their expected income and their loan in a single  though not necessarily the same  currency. Without qualitatively affecting the main hypotheses, our model is readily extendable to include firms that receive their expected income and loans in varying proportions in multiple currencies. currency funding for the bank, i.e.,
. Extensive empirical research, using a variety of methods, finds that the UIP rarely holds. Furthermore, the literature finds that the deviation from the UIP in emerging markets is systematic in nature and that a significant part of the excess return can be attributed to a risk premium.
14 For simplicity we assume that interest payments are made upfront at 0  t , and the loan repayment is made at 1  t .
15 Firms' earnings are verifiable ex post, so that payments are enforceable if a firm has sufficient earnings.
We assume that the exchange rate volatility is such that bad local currency earners will always default if they take a loan in foreign currency and the local currency depreciates, i.e., D LB e R  . We also assume that all good local currency earners have sufficient revenues to pay back their loan regardless of the exchange rate movements, i.e.,
D
LG e R  . Moreover, we assume that foreign currency earners have revenues that will enable them to fully repay a local currency loan even if the local currency appreciates, i.e., If firms default on a loan, they face costs of financial distress. For example, defaulters can henceforth find external financing only at penalty costs. In this case, the distress costs C may be proportional to or convex in the default amount (though still homogenous across firms). Alternatively, these costs may involve the private value to its owner of a firm that is lost in bankruptcy (for example, in the case of small and family-owned firms (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) )). 16 In this case, C will be independent of the default amount, 14 General reviews by Hodrick (1987) , Froot and Thaler (1990) , Lewis (1995) , Engel (1996) , for example. For emerging markets, see Francis, Hasan and Hunter (2002) and Alper, Ardic and Fendoglu (2009) . 15 Given our focus, we do not derive the optimality of this debt contract (see Townsend (1979) for example). 16 For example, this corresponds to the risk aversion of managers, as in Stulz (1984) , or of firms, as in Calvo (2001) . but will be heterogeneous among firms. As the focus of our analysis is the information asymmetry between banks and small firms, we assume that distress costs (in local currency units) differ across firms in each type. Among each type of firm
there is a share  with low costs C costs and a share 1   with high distress costs C .
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Given the above assumptions, the expected payoff j k v in local currency to a firm of type j taking a loan of type k equals:
III. Perfect Information Case
When banks are perfectly informed about the type of each firm, each bank sets six interest rates. For each of the three firm types,
, they set two interest rates, depending on whether a foreign or local currency loan is offered.
Proposition 1:
Under perfect information, all F and LG firms take foreign currency loans. The equilibrium share of LB firms that choose foreign currency loans is given as:
Proof:
The expected profits of banks in local currency from each loan type are:
Assuming perfect price competition, the expected profit on each loan type will be zero. Given our assumption that 0  
Inserting the equilibrium interest rates from [4] into [1], we obtain the following two results. Foreign currency earners ( F types) as well as good local currency earning firms (
LG types) always choose foreign currency loans. And the condition for LBfirms to choose a local currency loan is:
As a result we obtain the equilibrium share of LB firms that choose foreign currency loans as: 
IV. Imperfect Information Case
We now introduce an information asymmetry between banks and firms about the revenues of the firms. Assume that banks can neither verify the currency denomination nor the level of revenues of a firm, i.e., banks cannot distinguish between the three types of firms: F, LG, and LB firms. Banks, however, know that a proportion   In this case, the expected profits of banks in local currency from the two loan types are:
is the equilibrium share of LB firms taking foreign currency loans. In equilibrium, and with zero expected profit, interest rates must equal:
The interest rate charged on foreign currency loans covers the expected losses due to default on such loans. Under imperfect information, this depends on the share of LB firms taking such loans relative to F and LG firms.
Note that the interest rate that banks charge on foreign currency loans under asymmetric information lies between the rate it charges for such loans under perfect 18 The bank does not need to separate F from LG firms, as from the previous section we know that these two types never default on any loan, and thus should both receive the same (risk-free) interest rate on either a local or foreign currency loan. 19 In our model all banks are equally affected by the information asymmetry regardless of the currency in which they lend. Most domestic and foreign banks in Eastern Europe for example offer loans in both local and foreign currency to local firms (see Brown, Kirschenmann and Ongena (2010) and ). If financiers lend only in their own currency, existing models predict that: (1) Firms may borrow first in the local and then in the foreign currency, after having exhausted internal funds, if local financiers have better information about the firm than foreign financiers (pecking order hypothesis); (2) Firms with high monitoring costs may borrow more locally in the local currency (Diamond (1984) ); and (3) Better firms may borrow in the foreign currency to signal their quality, if foreign currency debt is more expensive (Jeanne (1999) ) or entails more regulatory scrutiny hence higher distress costs (Ross (1977) ).
information to F and LG firms, i.e., 0 , and the rate it charges to LB firms, i.e.,
Bad local currency earners for which
will choose foreign currency loans. From [1] we see that the share of LB firms which will take foreign currency loans will be:
, we can establish that the lowest interest rate l i at which LB firms start opting for foreign currency loans is
. We assume from now on that:
Assumption [10] ensures that unless there is a positive interest rate differential to the advantage of foreign currency funds, all LB firms will choose local currency loans. This assumption prevents that some LB firms choose foreign currency loans due to their limited liability even in the absence of an interest rate differential.
Propositions 2, 3 and 4 summarize how imperfect information changes the feasibility of separating, partial-pooling and full-pooling equilibria in our model. These propositions
show that compared to the perfect information case a separating equilibrium exists only for lower interest rate differentials between local and foreign currency. Partial pooling and full pooling equilibria, by contrast, are feasible at lower interest rate differentials than under perfect information.
Proposition 2 (Separating Equilibrium):
  a separating equilibrium will emerge.
Proof:
In 
a partial pooling equilibrium exists in which only LB firms with low distress costs C take foreign currency loans while LB firms with high distress costs C take local currency loans.
In a partial pooling equilibrium we have by definition   . From 
Note that in the partial-pooling and full-pooling equilibria described above we have assumed that LG and F firms chose foreign currency loans, which will be the case as long 
Follows directly from Propositions 2, 3 and 4. . At that interest rate for foreign currency loans all LB firms will prefer to take local currency loans, and thus there is no equilibrium in which foreign currency loans are offered.
A similar effect lead to market collapse at interest rates in the range [ii] , to the extent that these firms would be deterred from taking foreign currency loans. (1 )   LB firms with high distress costs consider switching from local currency to foreign currency loans. In both of these regions the only credit market equilibrium is characterized by all firms taking local currency loans.
V. Conclusion and Testable Hypotheses
Motivated by policy concerns about the credit risks resulting from unhedged foreign currency loans, especially in opaque financial environments, we investigate how an information asymmetry between banks and firms in a theoretical framework -that also features the trade-off between the cost and the risk of debt -may determine the currency denomination of bank loans to firms. Banks may not know the currency in which firms have contracted their sales or the level of firm revenues.
Our model shows that foreign currency earners and local currency earners with distress costs that are small vis-à-vis the interest rate differential choose foreign currency loans if the foreign interest rate is lower. With imperfect information for the banks concerning the currency and level of firm revenues, we show that more local currency earners switch to foreign currency loans.
Our model yields several testable hypotheses regarding the firm-level choice of loan denomination. We predict that the likelihood of choosing a foreign currency loan is positively related to the share of income a firm earns in foreign currency. Under the assumptions of our model, all foreign currency earners choose foreign currency loans, so the proportion of foreign currency earners taking foreign currency loans is always at least as high as that of local currency earners. However, our model shows that not only the currency denomination of a firm's cash flow is important, but also the magnitude of its cash flows compared to its potential loan repayments. Among firms with local currency earnings, firms with large revenues compared to their credit obligations are more likely to take foreign currency loans.
As predicted by the extant literature, the choice of a foreign currency loan should further be negatively related to the firm-level distress costs. The impact of distress costs on loan denomination should be stronger the lower the share of income a firm receives in foreign currency and the lower the revenue.
A key prediction of our model is that the choice of a foreign currency loan by local currency earners may be positively related to the opaqueness of the firm's revenue structure.
More local currency earners choose foreign currency loans under imperfect information than under perfect information. The impact of information opaqueness is stronger for firms with higher shares of revenue in local currency (our model suggests that imperfect information does not alter the currency choice for firms with foreign currency earnings only). Worsening information opaqueness results in more levered firms (i.e., those with lower cash flow-to-loan ratios) to take foreign currency loans.
At the macroeconomic level, our model predicts that the choice of a foreign currency loan will be positively related to the interest rate advantage on foreign currency funds which is given by nominal interest rate differential between local and foreign currencies minus the expected depreciation of the local currency (which is implicit and equals zero in our model). The impact of the interest rate differential, however, does depend on firm characteristics. The reaction to an increase in the interest rate differential should be stronger for firms with less income in foreign currency.
The choice of a foreign currency loan will further be negatively related to exchange rate volatility. If the local currency is more likely to depreciate and also the larger the depreciation, local currency earners (with low revenues) will be less likely to take a foreign currency loan. Moreover the impact of exchange rate volatility should be stronger for those firms with lower distress costs.
Finally, our model suggests that characteristics of the banking sector or of the legal environment that exacerbate information asymmetries between banks and firms may foster unhedged foreign currency borrowing. (1-p) *(φλ+1-λ)/(1-λ)
